Over the past years the European Commission has undergone it most significant changes since its inception. The resignation of the Santer-Commission in 1999 pushed reform to the top of the political agenda of the Commission. A range of internal reform measures transformed the functioning and administration of the Commission and its executive responsibilities. Moreover a long series of treaty revision-Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice-since the early 1990s, changed the legal and political framework governing the appointment and tasks and accountability of the Commission. This all contributed to the transformation of the political and administrative leadership in the European Commission. This paper explores how new rules, recruiting patterns, a change in role interpretations and a transformation in the relationships between political and administrative leaders in the European Commission have emerged.
Models of political-administrative roles and relations
One of the most complicated relationships within many governance systems is that between politicians and professional civil servants. While each have their share in running the public sector, it is often assumed that both have their own goals, interests, resources and commitments. Consequently, the relationship between politics and administration has been an important topic in the literature since the writings of
Wilson and Weber. The dominating perspective was that there was, or at least should be, a clear distinction between the sphere of politics and the sphere of administrations (Svara 2001; Overeem 2005) This classical dichotomy has long been challenged. Several authors have argued that a clear division is impossible, and a number of empirical studies show varying intermeshing of the two spheres (Aberbach et al. 1981; Svara and Mouritzen 2002) . These studies suggested that the interaction between politicians and administrators is more complex and differentiated (Putnam, 1975) . Aberbach et al. (1981) pointed to a growing involvement of civil servants in what had traditionally been described as 'political' roles. Of their famous four images to describe the relationship between politicians and administrators, image IV (the complete blurring of roles) seemed to become the face of the future when they conducted their interviews in the eighties. The four images of the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians reflected a steady progression of bureaucratic influence in policymaking from Image I, with its emphasis on politicians making decisions and bureaucrats implementing them, to the 'pure hybrids' of Image IV where the line between policy making and administration essentially vanishes, producing a seamless partnership between politicians and bureaucrats (Aberbach & Rockman 2006 Moreover the NPM-driven emphasis on performance and measurable outcomes rather than procedural correctness and hierarchical compliance may, paradoxically, have lessened the capacity of politicians to control bureaucrats and created more conflict between them. Svara (2001 Svara ( , 2006 argues that the extensive sharing and interaction along with important differences and areas of separation indicate the need for a dynamic view of the political-administrative relationship. The most current interactions among officials resemble a win-win situation of complementarity (see also Mouritzen & Svara 2002 ).
This key notion of complementarity is based on the presumption that politicians and Does the European Commission fit into any of these political-administrative models?
Although not a conventional government, the Commission is a body with features familiar to the larger comparative politics and public administration community. The
Commission is an international institution that has more in common with a national government than with any other international organization; it consists of a group of politicians at the top and an administrative apparatus beneath; and the tasks assigned to it, displays many of the same qualities as national governments (Egeberg 2004) .
The conceptual models of political-bureaucratic relationships have provided and can provide a framework for the analysis of political-bureaucratic relationship in the European Commission.
Looking back: Political and Bureaucratic Leadership in the Commission
Within the European Commission the organization of the political-bureaucratic interface is rather complex. This political-bureaucratic complexity was intentional from the start. Jean
Monnet's design for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) , today's European Commission, gave a High Authority of appointed experts administrators responsibility for both determining and implementing the policies of the ECSC (Stevens 2001: 220) . The Commission was designed as a technocratic body to propose solutions to policy problems, to broker deals, to provide the impetus for integration ('motor of integration') and to be the guardian of the common European interest. Decisions on the way in which that interest was to be practically specified and pursued, ought not to be subject to some kind of democratic majoritarian mechanism. The integration and mediating function should be guided by the judgement of a technocratic elite rather by political judgement. The reason is that politicians are bound to be short-sighted and self-seeking, as they are subject to electoral mechanisms. It makes for better governance to take the impartial, the overall and long term view of the technocrat. The Commission's role as a guardian of the European interest would depend on its expertise and its credibility as an impartial mediator between political views, conflicting national interests and interest group pressures.
The Commission image at this point may often have become synonymous with the concept of 'depoliticised technocratic body, the Commission's civil service on the other hand is often depicted as a politicized bureaucracy. Although formally a textbook case of a Weberian organization, in reality consociational practices are often superimposed on hierarchical relationships in the Commission (Hooghe 2001: 200) .
What makes the Commission less bureaucratic than other bureaux-is the nature of continuous bargaining in the Union. In the EU systems, policies are not only subject to the extensive deliberations in the legislative phase, but are also bound to be renegotiated when it comes to their implementation in different national contexts. Christiansen (1997: 77) argues: 'having to manage the resultant clash between pervasive political interests and the rigidities of the acquis communautaire is what makes the Commission such a special type of public administration'.
The fact that the Commission is a multinational bureaucracy has had a fundamental impact on its cohesion, demographic character and the form of political control. The educational, professional and cultural background of top-officials is extra-ordinarily divers and far more heterogeneous than that of top-officials in any national bureaucracy. Those that entered the Commission with a genuinely European educational formation were long time a minority. Studies in the mid 90s showed that national identifications in the Commission were important for network-building (Egeberg 1996) and sometimes became institutionalized in units, divisions and even whole DGs (Christiansen 1997: 83 and their top-officials in that period is to understand it as a form of the pure hybrid of Aberbach's et al. (1981) Image IV in which a fusion of decision-making and administration has taken place.
Crisis & Change: Reinventing the Commission
In the past decade the Commission has changed and three crises were needed to bring this change in motion.The first concerns a crisis in the Commission's political credentials; the second involves the manifestation of the Commission 'plumbing problems' (Peterson 2006) ; and the final crisis involves the Commission's credibility.
Together, these three problems created a climate in and outside the Commission that reforms of the Commission's operation were seriously needed. Questions relating to the legitimacy of the EU integration process, its governance and its institutions were seriously raised (Tsakatika 2005: 200-204) . The legitimacy of the way in which European integration was taking place came under fire. Europe was charged with a 'democratic deficit' which weighed heavily on its legitimate governance. Severe criticism emerged on the fact that an independent and unaccountable technocratic elite in the Commission was allowed to play a role that was so important.
For some the real problem with European governance was not the Commission's traditionally weak democratic credentials (input legitimacy) but its diminishing problem solving efficiency (output legitimacy). The Commission's organization came under increasing attack in the mid 1990s for handling of its executive responsibilities. The organization had, as Peterson (2006) calls it, 'plumbing problems': it tended to leak money and work inefficiently. Over the 1990s, as the pace of the European integration picked up, the size of the Union increased and its range of policies expanded, the Commission suffered the consequences of success.
Though it became larger, at the same time it was assigned an ever-increasing range of tasks and responsibilities (Christiansen 2001: 758) . Majone (2002: 389) argues that the expansion of competences should, however, not be mistaken for a sign of growing strength: 'new and often ill-defined powers have tended to dilute the Commission's core commitments'
The result has not only been a weakening of the organization but also a loss of The EP has gradually gained more weight in the appointment procedure; the EP shall not only be consulted on the choice of the President, but also been assigned the right to approve his/her appointment. Steps have been taken to render the College directly accountable to the EP as illustrated by the EP committees' examination of nominated Commissioners, its vote of confidence, and its right to dismiss the entire College.
Moreover, the new investiture procedures by the EP may contribute to a new form of 'credit' that commissioners can build up for their internal and external leadership during their mandate; commissioners can claim to represent a legitimacy which is not simply based upon bureaucratic hierarchical rank but reflects the facts that their appointment is a political one-supported by the EP-procedure.
As the selection of commissioners has become more 'political', the appointment of top-officials is designed to become less 'politicized'. In the past, timeserving and the right political and national connections were often more valuable for promotion prospects than a good performance record. The Santer as well as the Prodi Commission both claimed that more weight should be assigned to merit and internal recruitment and less to nationality and 'parachuting'. The new staff regulations that Recruiting patterns have altered for both commissioners and top-officials in such a way that we can observe the growth of a political-administrative gap. Yet there are also some mechanisms in the selection of commissioners and their top-officials that can build some common ground. From the literature we learn that the training and background which political executives bring with them to office will tend to influence the manner in which they interact with the permanent civil service staff that they find when they come to the office (Peters 1988: 171) . Usually, the more generalist orientation of political executives is usually contrasted with the more specialized background of executives. Generalists will be less able to contests issues on substantive grounds than political executives with more specialized training.
Generalist political executives may be more expected to be associated with what Peters (1988) calls the administrative state model. Specialist career patterns of political executives may be more related to an adversarial relationship or to the functional model of interaction.
In case of the current European Commission we observe at the top however a lesser amount of specialist career patterns on both the political and the bureaucratic side. Most commissioner of Barroso's College had general and not specialist backgrounds and if we look at the top of the administration we see also a tendency towards the development of generalist career patterns among top-officials. In the mobility policy for top-officials managerial competencies being increasingly preferred over professionalism based on a specific knowledge about, and the handling of policy fields. With the development towards generalist career patterns among commissioners and their senior-officials and with generalist patterns of training-law and economics is the most common study among both commissioners and their top-officials-it is not unlikely that these backgrounds can create something of a shared understanding to work on a collaborative relationship between the two distinct groups.
A mechanism, sometimes visible at the level of nation states, and that reinforces a elite integration is the presence of personnel overlap between political and administrative spheres (see Peters 2001, 85-133) As the policy role of senior officials is diminished, the political responsiveness dimension is increased. Directors general have become more disposable in the new rotation-system; once it is perceived that a director general has gone over the line, his (or her) usefulness is at an end and the notion of continuity and experience of the civil service is evaporating. Whether or not the 'speaking truth to power' qualities suffer from this change is unknown presently, but it seems logical to assume that as the criteria for success become more arbitrary or capricious, top-officials will begin to behave more like the political appointees whose job depend on personal loyalty to commissioners. One way or another short term contracts, in combination with performance goals and objectives created by the college of commissioners obviously increases the responsiveness of senior officials to political direction.
The Commission reform has thus had important implications for the job of senior officials: a reconfigured policy role, new performance demands and skill requirements, and new accountability expectations and mechanisms; and increasing demands for political responsiveness.
While witnessing substantial shifts in the conception of the roles that commissioners It seems sensible to think that with a shift in the roles of the commissioner, the roles of their heads of cabinets have changed too, but the data from the interviews are still a moot on this point. It is clear though that the detachment of leading servants from the DGs to serve in the cabinets implied that the cabinets gradually has acquired a major influence over the day-to day running of the Commission. The cabinets appear increasingly to be drawn into the details of policy making and monitoring. As a result, the heads of cabinets (can) have an important role in setting priorities and dealing with problems of governance. How far they have actually been drawn into the day-to-day management of the DGs is hard to say. It seems to vary from cabinet to cabinet and has been a function of the approach of individual commissioners and their heads of cabinets. Yet with the increasing role of policy making there is the danger of a parallel bureaucracy. This makes the relations between cabinet heads and topofficials from the DG are inevitably delicate (see also Spence 2006) .
Distinct worlds, Distinct Perspectives, but Overlapping Roles
Generally speaking, the interview data revealed/showed persistent and sharp Table 1 summarizes the essentials of the three roles. It is possible to conclude that bureaucrats and politicians in the European Commission did live in distinctive worlds.
- Table 1 about hereApart from the substantial differences between commissioners and their top-officials, there are also significant similarities. Both groups report a genuine concern for the general public European interest. Moreover, both realized that they worked in a political environment and that this affected their work. Though both groups were aware of the political world they operated in, the main difference is the kind of politics they were involved in. Commissioners dealt with broad ideas; parliamentary politics; member states and the politics of parties. Directors general dealt with the politics of bureaucracies, advising commissioners, and so on. For all leaders in the Commission--commissioners, heads of cabinets and directors general alike--'doing politics successfully' means increasingly that they need to share a defined set of executive core qualities and skills: have the ability to build coalitions and to communicate and to manage interpersonal relations. These critical leading capacities may provide a common ground for political and administrative executives to cooperate.
Partnerships in Flux
Commissioners and their top-officials have very different backgrounds, aims, jobs, and styles of work. As Peterson (2007) showed attempts by the College to reassert authority through bringing the work of the services within the ambit of the political level. There was and is a desire to improve hierarchical political direction of the services and increasingly the Commission has been using targets as mechanisms of control. The Commission has been caught by a modern reform dilemma: on the one hand they have sought greater control over the services and its programmes; but on the other they have sought the advantages in decentralizing responsibility and trying to sit 'above' the dangerous cauldron of dayto-day operational failures and achievements (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004: 146) . The purport of this latter aspect is that it limits commissioners to 'indirect steering' (Svara 2006b: 6) and that the influence of the permanent bureaucracy remains substantial.
Perhaps it was the day-to day practice of this conundrum that led Verheugen to make his observation. 
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Box 1 Setting objectives and priorities in the European Commission
In 2000, the Commission acknowledged the need for management focused more closely on results and decided to develop a conceptual framework for activity-based management. To that end, the Commission divided up its work into a set of politically meaningful "activities'. This box explains how the Commission's overall strategy is developed, and its objectives defined as part of its annual policy cycle, developing a coherent and organised work programme, and how its activity-based management works at the operational level. In practical terms, the Commission's work is planned and reported on in the following steps of the annual strategic planning and programming, and reporting cycle.
− Upon entering into office the Commission establishes its five-year strategic objectives which would mark its political project over the duration of its term of office.
− The orientation debate held amongst the College of Commissioners initiates the strategic planning and programming cycle (SPP) and defines priorities and strategic objectives of the Commission for the following year. The Secretary-General informs the services of the conclusions of the College and services make proposals to convert College orientations into specific operations.
− Based on the orientation debate and the subsequent proposals of the services, the Commission decides upon its annual policy strategy which sets out the political priorities for the year to come and orientations for the allocation of human and financial resources. The annual strategy provides the framework for the preliminary draft budget and for the Commission's annual work programme.
− The President of the Commission presents the annual policy strategy to the European Parliament and the Council. The three institutions then engage in a structured dialogue and each Commissioner has a discussion with the relevant Parliamentary committee. The result of this dialogue is a stock taking document which is used to prepare the Commission work programme for the following year. The Commission work programme translates policy strategy into a concrete action plan and a set of deliverables.
− Each Commission department (directorate-general) then develops its annual management plan. These describe how departments plan their activities and how they contribute to the priorities set by the Commission, including the allocation of human and financial resources to the activities. Since the introduction of activity-based management, these plans have to set clear, specific, measurable and verifiable objectives for each activity as well as indicators for the monitoring and reporting on the progress made and the impact of the activities to the EU citizens.
− At an operational, day-to-day level, the Commission has also introduced an 'agenda planning' system in order to provide reliable programming of initiatives foreseen for adoption. A forward programming document is updated every month and sent to other EU institutions in order to help them organise their own activities. The rolling programme is accompanied by an execution report.
− A new procedure to assess the impact of a given initiative in the economic, environmental and social area was adopted in 2002. The Commission services prepare an impact assessment of all major work programme initiatives. Impact assessment is an aid to political decision, not a substitute for it. It informs decision-makers of the likely impacts of proposals, but it leaves it up to them to take the decisions.
− Once the budgetary year is ending, all directorates-general have to report on the degree of achievement of the objectives that were set in their annual management plans. They establish an annual activity report. The Commission collects the main conclusions of the different annual activities reports in a synthesis report which is presented to the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Source: http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/strategy/index_en.htm
